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offered to produce a Copie of a purchass of the sd. Island from [fol. 67 b] his highness the Duke of Yorke to certain persons under whom he claims pretending by that a Libertie or licence by Implication to send ouer inhabitants to plant the same ; the Island being only bought to that vse and purpas.

S<sup>r</sup> If the Conuayance be from his R. Highness and under such a Condition, I should be glad to receiue his plesure therein before o<sup>r</sup> next sessions soon after Xmas wher the Recognisance for the said Mathews his appearance or further trouble at the Assizes may be withdrawn, or his Highness may please to giue order to the Judges of Assize for the discharge of it ther what commands his Highness shall thinke fitt to direct to me in this or any other perticular shall be duely obserued by

Yrs.

J. RERESBY.

## 2. Carondelet on the Defence of Louisiana, 1794.

The following document is a letter from Baron Carondelet, governor of the provinces of Louisiana and West Florida, to his captain-general, and enclosed in a letter from Carondelet to the Duke of Alcudia, first secretary of state, etc., December 1, 1794 (No. 48 Secret; *Archivo general central en Alcalá, Estado*, Legajo 3897). The letter is translated by Professor W. F. Giese, of the University of Wisconsin, from the copy secured in 1883 for the Draper Collection (39 Clark MSS., p. 16) of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, and kindly furnished by Mr. Reuben G. Thwaites, Secretary of the Society. The document shows the governor's preparations for resisting the proposed French expedition against New Orleans, in 1793-1794, projected by the minister Genet, with George Rogers Clark in command of the Kentucky forces. The full collection of the Draper manuscripts, so far as they illustrate this expedition, will appear in the forthcoming report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission ; but this letter is separately published as being less directly concerned with the Clark-Genet project, and as revealing the ideas of the Spanish authorities with respect to the advance of the American frontiersmen ; the Spanish plans for resisting an attack by river and sea ; the military condition of Louisiana posts in 1794 ; the Spanish opinion concerning the boundaries of Louisiana ; and the effort of Carondelet to secure an exploration up the Missouri to the Pacific ocean, prophetic of Lewis and Clark's expedition.

The letter is followed in the original by an enclosure of four or five thousand words, giving additional data regarding the strategic value of the separate posts, their armament ; amounts necessary to place them in order ; distances, etc.

The maps referred to in the letter are not in the Draper Collection. But excellent maps and plans of the fortifications mentioned on the Mississippi were made by General Collot for the French government in 1796, and are published in the atlas accompanying Collot's *Journey in North America*, Paris, 1826.

FREDERICK J. TURNER.

CARONDELET TO ALCUDIA.

NEW ORLEANS, NOV. 24, 1794.

Baron de Carondelet gives detailed information concerning the condition and strength of Louisiana, the respective situation of its strongholds, forts and points of vantage, etc.

No. 129. Most Excellent Sir,

In compliance with your order of the 16th of last June, in which your Excellency requests me to send the most detailed information obtainable concerning the condition and strength of Louisiana, the respective situation of its strongholds, forts and points of vantage, and other particulars that must be known in order that the plan of defense suited to the circumstances of this province may be examined by a body of generals, in conformity with the wishes of His Majesty; I have ordered the accompanying map to be drawn up, in accordance with the most trustworthy representations obtainable since I took possession of this government: for all the maps printed in England, in the United States, and in France are absolutely false, particularly as to the course of the Misisipi<sup>1</sup> and Misuri rivers, while at the same time those settlements both Spanish and American which date since its publication, are necessarily omitted.

Louisiana, which extends from 29° North latitude to beyond the fiftieth parallel, comprises about a thousand leagues, between the mouths of the Misisipi or the Ocean and the source of the former; a boundary incontestably acknowledged by England in the sixth article of the treaty of peace of 1763, by virtue of which Spain can contest with the English and Americans the commerce they are carrying on with the savage tribes living above the 44th parallel; but I consider that the attention and efforts of Spain must be confined to the conservation of the control of the Misisipi as far as the river St. Peter,<sup>2</sup> situated in the same latitude; in the meantime the growth of the population of the settlements of Illinois,<sup>3</sup> which must be considered as yet only in their infancy, will not admit of rivalry with the English of Canada, and particularly with the Americans, who, advancing with incredible rapidity toward the North and the

<sup>1</sup> The spelling of proper names in the original has been preserved in the translation when this would cause no mistake or uncertainty.

<sup>2</sup> *San Pedro*.

<sup>3</sup> *Illinoia*.

Misisipi, will assuredly force Spain to recognize the Misuri as the limit within a short time, and perhaps they will pass beyond it unless the plan is adopted which I have proposed to his Majesty in reserved communication No. 36, of June 3rd last, sent through the Ministry of State.

In case Louisiana did not extend beyond the Misuri, it would suffice to glance at the map to be convinced of its importance for the preservation of the interior provinces of New Spain and of the kingdom of Mexico, which the Misisipi and Misuri rivers enclose<sup>1</sup> from the Gulf almost to the South Sea ; at least, from the reports of various traders and travellers who have lately penetrated by the Misuri among the savage tribes, of which we had scarcely any knowledge, it is to be inferred that this great river, navigable throughout, rises at a slight distance from a chain of very high mountains which are not over forty leagues distant from the South Sea ; and it is even supposed that there rises at the foot of these mountains another large and navigable river, which empties into this sea. I hope we shall soon have information regarding this matter, through the efforts of the company of explorers just established in San Luis de Illinoia,<sup>2</sup> and the reward which I have promised to the one who, following the Misuri, shall penetrate to the above-mentioned sea and bring certain news concerning the situation and strength of the Russian settlements, in case they approach that part of the coast.

When France ceded Louisiana to Spain in '62, it did not comprise more than sixty leagues on the eastern bank of the Misisipi, from its mouth to Iberville,<sup>3</sup> and on the western bank a thousand from the mouth of the river to the comparatively unknown source of the same.

The total population of Louisiana amounted to scarcely 17,000 souls ; its commerce was carried on with six vessels and was limited to indigo and furs : Louisiana, therefore, in the hands of the French, was almost a nonentity, and although its inhabitants carried on some contraband operations in the Gulf, (the only branch of industry yielding a profit capable of arousing their avidity,) on account of the close alliance of France with Spain, they did not dare to penetrate into the interior provinces nor to undertake contraband enterprises on the sea capable of giving rise to complaints on her part.

By ceding this province the French got rid of a territory which the vicinity of the English and their commercial rivalry made them despair of rendering fruitful and of preserving, while its possession was rendered highly onerous to them by the cupidity of governors and other functionaries.

At the time of this cession and subsequently, while the English ruled what at present forms the United States of America, Louisiana did not deserve particular attention from the Spanish government ; because the English, satisfied with their numerous possessions on this continent as well as with the lucrative contraband enterprises facilitated by the navigation

<sup>1</sup>*Circunvalan.*

<sup>2</sup> St. Louis, Mo.

<sup>3</sup> *Iberville.*

of the Misisipi and of the Lakes to their settlements of Manchak, Baton Rouge and Natchez, never thought of penetrating into the interior provinces and through their activity and contraband traffic the province was kept in the same state of torpor and poverty as before, so that its revenue did not exceed 115 dollars.<sup>1</sup>

The North American revolution and the taking of the forts of Manchak, Baton Rouge, Natchez, Mobile and Pensacola, entirely changed the state of things on this continent. Spain, when peace was made, acquired an immense territory, since from San Luis de Ilinoia to the extremity of Florida is a distance of over 692 leagues: a territory in Louisiana, rich, fertile and watered by innumerable navigable rivers emptying into the sea, so that agriculture and commerce on a vast scale are here possible. Indigo inferior to that of Guatemala but superior to that of Caracas; cotton of very good quality but not very abundant; sugar-cane for making molasses; rice of superior quality; maize; timber for masts or building; these are the products of lower Louisiana; grain, sufficient in time for supplying our islands; tobacco, equal to that of Virginia; maize, barley, salt meat, rich and abundant furs, lead mines on the surface of the earth, such are the products of upper Louisiana. The population of both consists now of 40,000 industrious and warlike people for whose commerce and supplies a hundred vessels a year are insufficient.

These great advantages are counterbalanced by the immoderate ambition of a new people, adventurous and hostile to all subjection, who have gone on gathering and multiplying in the silence of peace and almost unnoticed, with a prodigious rapidity, since the recognition of the independence of the United States up to this date. They began with those soldiers to whom, as a reward for their services in the war of independence, were given the uncultivated lands of Kentucky and of the southern bank of the Ohio. The fertility of the soil, the charms of the climate, the promising navigation of the Misisipi and the Ohio, the spirit of insubordination and the revolutions of Europe attracted so many people to Kentucky and to the lands west of the Alegany and Apalache mountains, that the vast territory, which in 1780 was uninhabited, already comprises three states and various settlements, whose total population exceeds 50,000 men capable of carrying arms and is increasing annually by the addition of more than 10,000 emigrants from Europe.

This vast and restless population, progressively driving the Indian tribes before them and upon us, seek to possess themselves of all the vast regions which the Indians occupy between the Ohio and Misisipi rivers, the Gulf of Mexico and the Apalache mountains, thus becoming our neighbors at the same time that they demand with menaces the free navigation of the Misisipi. If they achieve their object, their ambitious projects will not be confined to this side of the Misisipi; their writings, public papers and speeches all turn on this point, the free navigation to the Gulf by the rivers Misisipi, Mobile,<sup>2</sup> Pearl<sup>3</sup> and Apalachicola which empty

<sup>1</sup> Original is not clear here; possibly 1,150 pesos, or the last figure might be an 8 or 9.

<sup>2</sup> *Mobile*.

<sup>3</sup> *Pearla*.

into it, the rich fur trade of the Misuri, and in time the possession of the rich mines of the interior provinces of the very kingdom of Mexico. Their mode of growth and their policy are as formidable for Spain as their arms: every new settlement amounting to 30,000 souls forms a state, which is included in the United States as regards reciprocal protection, but which governs and taxes itself. Their roving spirit and the readiness with which these people procure sustenance and shelter, facilitates rapid settlement. A rifle<sup>1</sup> and a little corn-meal in a bag is sufficient for an American wandering alone in the woods for a month; with the rifle he kills wild cattle and deer for food and also defends himself against the savages; the corn-meal soaked serves as bread; with tree-trunks placed transversely he forms a house, and even an impregnable fort against the Indians, building a second story above the first. The cold does not terrify him, and when a family grows weary of one locality it moves to another and settles there with the same ease. In this manner and in eight years has grown up the settlement of Cumberland, which is about to declare itself a state.

If such men come to occupy the banks of the Misisipi and Misuri, or secure their navigation, there is no doubt that nothing will prevent them from crossing and penetrating into our provinces on the other side, which being to a great extent deserted can not oppose any resistance. But, even if they were not so, who shall warrant that their few inhabitants will not unite with joy and eagerness with men, who, offering them their help and protection for the securing of independence, self-government and self-taxation, will flatter them with the spirit of liberty, the hope of free, extensive and lucrative commerce, etc.? In my opinion, a general revolution, in America, threatens Spain, unless a remedy be applied promptly and forcibly. I am aware that being involved in so burdensome a war, Spain can, with difficulty devote attention to this matter, however important; but, the evil being as yet only in its beginning, I consider that a provisional remedy may be resorted to which will forestall these prejudicial results until a more favorable time permit a radical cure.

I have clearly shown, in several communications addressed to his Excellency the Duke de Alcudia, that all the power of the Atlantic states is insufficient to restrain those of the west who are resolved to secure by force of arms the navigation of the Misisipi and to separate themselves from the former, in case they seek to oppose their project, by declaring themselves independent or by uniting with Canada. I have shown the moral impossibility in which Spain is placed, of attacking the Kentuckians and other Western settlers in their own country; but at the proper time I have proposed the means of protecting Louisiana from their projects and of devastating all their possessions, by means of our allies the Chactas,<sup>2</sup> Chicachas,<sup>3</sup> Criks<sup>4</sup> and Cheroquies,<sup>5</sup> who, fearing the irruptions of the Americans, will be disposed, provided always they be incited with presents and arms, to levy the most destructive warfare.

With two Spanish regiments complete in addition to the fixed forces

<sup>1</sup> *Carabina*.

<sup>2</sup> Choctaws.

<sup>3</sup> Chickasaws.

<sup>4</sup> Creeks.

<sup>5</sup> Cherokees.

of the province, 150 gunners, the six galleys and two galiots already existing, well-manned, and an addition of a hundred thousand dollars annually to the Indian budget for the purchase of arms, ammunition and presents necessary in order to employ the tribes effectually, I answer for Louisiana and for the exclusive possession of the Misisipi river by Spain, against all the power and all the forces of the American states, whether united or separated from the Atlantic states; but for this purpose, it is necessary to increase promptly the defenses of New Madrid and Nogales<sup>1</sup> with earthworks, until his Majesty decide on the construction of those to be fully described hereafter.

After taking these provisional measures, if to Kentucky and to the other western settlements be offered war on the one hand and peace on the other, on the conditions set forth in private communication No. 36 which I sent to his Excellency the Duke de Alcudia, I am persuaded that the tempest which threatens Louisiana and the other Spanish possessions in America will for some years be dissipated; and will even be so permanently, if approval is given to the plan of free commerce with the friendly tribes as proposed in the same communication, as it is certain that Louisiana will in a few years equal or perhaps surpass in fertility, cultivation, commerce and wealth, the American states of the West. Spain will find in its inhabitants an active force, composed of brave and warlike men, equally fitted for service by land or sea, and which can be employed in case of war against any power except France, for expeditions in America and particularly for the defense of the island of Cuba and of the kingdom of Mexico; the royal revenues which have scarcely amounted to 90,000 dollars hitherto, and which will possibly fall below 60,000 this year, as I predicted on seeing the new regulation that has been published, will pay the outlay of the royal Treasury in full within ten years, even though estimated at 700,000 dollars.

Recurring to the defensive plan which it seems to me indispensable to adopt at present, when the American states of the West, about to convene in an assembly, are seeking to profit by the opportunity offered them by the present war against France, to open the Misisipi for themselves, I am of the opinion that our settlements from the Misuri river to New Madrid should be protected by a regiment, the first battalion being stationed in San Luis de Ilinoia, and the second in New Madrid, dividing between them the forty leagues intervening on the western bank of the Misisipi, so as to prevent by a few small detachments the incursion of scattered bands that might cross the river, and maintaining in the settlement of Saint Genevieve,<sup>2</sup> the center of this extension, a strong detachment from both battalions, to restrain the settlement of Kaskaskias which lies opposite. This cordon, or line, supported on the right by the fort of New Madrid, on its left by that of San Luis de Ilinoia, and in its centre by that of Saint Genevieve, would allow sufficient time for the militia,

<sup>1</sup> Walnut Hills, Vicksburg. This fort was begun in 1790 to resist the Yazoo Company.

<sup>2</sup> *Santa Genoveva.*

who are all soldiers, to come up by land to the points of attack, since the journey from New Madrid to San Luis is made on horseback in four days. The savage tribes the chavanones, abenakis, cheroquis and osages<sup>1</sup> would form a second line of defence of 1500 men at least, who would not allow any hostile party to pass. Finally, four galleys and some very light craft armed with cannon, would guard the front of the line and the passage of the river, with all the more superiority, as the enemy has no port whatever on the Misisipi in which to build boats of equal force.

The same four galleys would guard the mouth of the Ohio, through which the enemy, when the water is high, can come down in force with an expedition formed on the same river, which is distant only ten leagues from the fort of New Madrid; and its fires not being sufficient to prevent their passing, they could advance straight to the fort of Nogales, whose possession would open to them the whole of lower Louisiana as far as the capital, and would furnish them the means of undertaking the siege of the same.

The stationing of the galleys at New Madrid not only renders this project impossible, but lays the enemy open to a complete repulse on their entry into the Misisipi, on account of the superior artillery carried by these boats, and on account of the advantage they must expect in a combat engaged under the protection of the fire of the troops, militia, and savages from the western bank, without any danger to them.

Assuming, however, that the combat should be decided in favor of the enemies, the same galleys would find their retreat secured under the cannon of New Madrid, which the enemy would be forced to besiege, since if it was decided to descend to Nogales, leaving New Madrid behind, the galleys would go in pursuit and would be protected in the Exores à Margot<sup>2</sup> by the fires from both banks, *i. e.* those of the Chicachas, who could occupy the heights with more than a thousand warriors, while our Indians were pouring volleys of musketry from the opposite shore, so that they would certainly expose themselves to being completely routed.

This explanation shows the necessity of fortifying in the most serious fashion the fort of New Madrid,<sup>3</sup> as it must necessarily be the first object of attack on the part of the enemy. If garrisoned with a battalion, with suitable 12-pound artillery, thirty artillerymen, two hundred militiamen, and protected by some 1500 Indians who can harass the enemy during the siege by occupying the vicinity, molesting their men when they go in search of fagots, wood, etc., it can hold a long time against all the efforts of the enemy and consequently allow sufficient time for gathering the forces of upper Louisiana and attempting with their aid to raise the siege.

<sup>1</sup> Shawnees, Abenakis, Cherokees, Osages?

<sup>2</sup> Near Chickasaw Bluff, Memphis, Tenn. Compare Ford's *Jefferson's Writings*, VII. 335-336, for Jefferson's ignorance of location of "*Ecores amargas*."

<sup>3</sup> Established in 1789.



Exores            Assuming that the enemy succeed in their attack on  
à            New Madrid, if the galleys succeed in withdrawing,  
Margot.        favored by the current of the river, they can lie in wait for  
                 them in the above-mentioned Exores à Margot situated  
                 forty leagues below, which passage, dominated by heights  
                 that are prolonged on the eastern bank of the river, for a  
                 distance of twenty leagues, will be (provided always that  
                 the Chicachas be willing to defend it,) exceeding difficult  
                 to force since the currents carry the boats precisely toward  
                 those heights.

Whoever can secure from the Chicacha tribe sufficient land for building a fort on the height situated between the Casas and Carondelet rivers, will undeniably be master of the navigation of the Misisipi from New Madrid to Nogales; and if the Americans are frustrated of the hope of making this establishment, long since planned by them, and of which they have even made a survey and will assuredly hesitate at no expense to gain the good-will of the tribe, it is certain that they will find no suitable place for forming a port on the whole east shore from the Ohio to Nogales, since it is all under water during the rise of the Misisipi. The Chicacha tribe, more jealous than any other of the possession of its lands, is aware of the importance of the Exores à Margot; but a good present, dexterously and opportunely offered, may surprise their consent, wherefore I am of the opinion that thirty thousand dollars would not be an excessive sum for the accomplishment of this purpose and for permanently depriving the Americans of the hope they entertain of having a port on the Misisipi.

A regular fort in the Exores à Margot admitting of a garrison of a hundred men, which would be provided by the battalion of New Madrid, might, in view of the distance, with all its dependencies, cost likewise thirty thousand dollars.

Fort of            After forcing the pass of Exores à Margot, the enemy  
Nogales.        will descend to Nogales<sup>1</sup>, situated five leagues below the  
                 Yasu,<sup>2</sup> whose fires combined with those of the two other  
                 galleys which will be stationed below the fort, will neces-  
                 sarily detain them, because the currents, as at Exores, carry  
                 the boats to the east bank, obliging them to pass at the foot  
                 of the battery, a circumstance which will necessitate a siege  
                 in order to pass.

This will last all the longer, since all the forces of the province will have had time to gather on the Yasu to defend its banks and the pass against the hostile army, which will have these forces before them and behind them, and

<sup>1</sup> Walnut Hills, Vicksburg.

<sup>2</sup> Yazoo.

on their left flank a swarm of Chactas and Chicachas Indians. The river Yasu, which protects, as I have said, the territory of Nogales, overflows its banks at high water to a considerable distance, and leaves on the retreat of the deluge a swampy land covered with trees and therefore of easy defence for an army. This post, therefore, demands all the attention of the government, and there should be built here a fort, covered with brick, which the advantages of its situation will make one of the strongest in America.

A battalion providing the detachments for Natchez, Akansas, Ouachita and the neighboring posts, would garrison that of Nogales with thirty artillerymen in time of peace, and in time of war its garrison would be increased in accordance with circumstances.

Plaza of  
Natchez.

Nogales passed, nothing can prevent the enemy from descending to the capital, since in that distance of 90 leagues, the most populous of the whole province, no forts are found except those of Natchez, Baton Rouge and Manchak on the eastern bank. The first, dominated from every side, will never be susceptible of a regular defence; for which reason I have at various times proposed to suspend its works which have as little solidity as the sands that compose them, and to transfer its governor, artillery and employees to Nogales, so that there shall only remain at Natchez, as in the time of the French, a commanding officer with thirty men, and a detachment of about fifteen dragoons, who will suffice for protecting that district from molestation by the Indians, and to maintain the inhabitants in due subordination to the Government, whose head, it is true, would be forty leagues distant, but these can be speedily traversed either by land or water.

Forts of  
Baton Rouge  
and  
Manchak.

The forts of Baton Rouge and Manchak are in ruins, nothing having been repaired but their dependencies since they were taken from the English. Baton Rouge offers the most attractive and advantageous position for commanding the river and delaying the enemy for a considerable time; placed precisely half-way between Nogales and the capital, that is at a distance of forty leagues from either, it can, in case of a disaster at Nogales, favor the retreat of the troops and galleys to the capital, and prevent the enemy, though masters of the western banks, from extending their incursions into the whole cultivated part of the province and opposing the succors of men and provisions which the capital may obtain there.

The fort of Manchak may be abandoned as useless.

No doubt the enemy, after taking Natchez and Nogales, can avoid Baton Rouge by directing their advance over

the road which goes down to the port of Galvez-town, and, by embarking on the lakes, can arrive, without any opposition, to within half a league of New Orleans, but the militia and the savages, who would beset them in the woods, would harass them greatly, while New Orleans, moreover, can not be taken without a train of heavy artillery, which cannot be transported through those regions without the greatest labor.

Fort of  
Galveztown.

However, Galveztown being a point of transit much frequented, both by the Americans going to Georgia and Natchez, and by the savages going to the capital and elsewhere, and since, owing to the communication of the lakes through the rivers Iberville and Amit with the Misisipi, an enemy commanding the sea can avoid the defences raised at the entrance of the Misisipi, he can introduce himself into the heart of lower Louisiana, passing through the above-mentioned lakes in small boats, such as bilandors and galiots, and thence by way of the rivers to Manchak. From there, if the inhabitants should favor them, they could descend the Misisipi without the slightest opposition to the capital, becoming masters of the coasts, or if not, cutting off communication between Nogales and New Orleans by fortifying themselves in Baton Rouge. I consider it therefore of the supremest importance to rebuild the fort of Galvez-town, now in total ruin, its situation to be at the point formed by the confluence of the Amit and Iberville rivers; about twenty thousand dollars will suffice for its construction with its dependencies; and if made to hold a garrison of a hundred men in time of war, to be provided from the garrison of New Orleans, and a hundred and fifty militiamen from the district, it would suffice, supported by a number of Chactas Indians, to divert the enemy from the project of penetrating by the lakes into the province, or by the country of the Indians, should they succeed in separating them from Spain.

Fort of  
Akansas.

There still remains one passage to be cut off from the enemy, through which after forcing Exores à Margot, they might penetrate into that part of lower Louisiana, which lies on the western bank of the Misisipi, without passing Nogales: This is the river Akansas, navigable for keel-boats, through which the enemy can ascend to the village, situated twelve leagues from its junction with the Misisipi, and can go from there by a well-known and practicable road, to the settlements of Ouachita, Atak-apas, Opelouzaz, Natchitoches, etc. which have no other defense than their militia and some Indian tribes; but, if a fort is built there, or a redoubt of mud and turf, in the same place as the

present one,<sup>1</sup> which consisting only of a staked enclosure with a garrison of thirty men, can only serve against the Indians, it is evident that a hundred men, to be provided in time of war from Nogales, united with as many more militiamen, all excellent hunters living in the settlement, and finally with some two hundred very valiant warriors of the Akansas tribe, could advantageously oppose an enemy attempting to mount the river, and could put in his way enough difficulties to deter him from undertaking a dangerous expedition through a level country, without artillery and threatened with lack of provisions and attacks from the cavalry of the militia of Natchitoches, Atak-apas, Akansas, etc. which would severely harass the enemy, provided the defense of the fort of Akansas allowed time to assemble and to oppose an advance into their interior of the country.

New  
Orleans.

Having vanquished all the obstacles mentioned, the enemy would advance against New Orleans, whose defences, consisting only of five earth redoubts, with a trench and a covered road furnished with a strong stockade, these redoubts being united with one another by the same stockade protected by a good glacis, at whose foot is a trench and an ante-glacis, with a redan in the middle of each curtain, do not offer the idea of a place capable of much resistance ; but experience will demonstrate the contrary, provided it is furnished with the proper artillery, 94 twelve and twenty-four pounders, and 3000 regular troops, including a squadron of dragoons.

Plan of  
defence.

This place being situated in the middle of a plain on the eastern bank of the Misisipi, on land that continuously declines from the river to the estuary, which runs almost parallel with the Misisipi, at half a league's distance from it, carrying its waters to the lakes which empty into the sea, its environs may very easily be inundated from February to August, without damage to the city, since the water only reaches the foot of the streets.

A succession of swampy woods, which the people of the country call the Cypriera,<sup>2</sup> run parallel with the Misisipi at a distance of three or four hundred fathoms from its edge, and form another insuperable obstacle to those not accustomed to it ; whence it results that the enemy can only advance to the attack by the Royal road which follows the bank of the river, and which being swept lengthwise by the artillery of the redoubt and crosswise by the fires of the second redoubt and of the redan, would be rendered almost

<sup>1</sup> Erected in 1789.

<sup>2</sup> *Cipriera*.

impracticable during high-water by cutting the dikes at intervals. To these obstacles to the conducting of attacks and establishing of batteries, is added the difficulty of excavating trenches in land from which the water oozes at two feet below the surface. The enemy being confined to a very narrow space, a highway as it were, in order to approach the fortifications, it is possible to keep up a superior fire, increasing the number of batteries with the greatest ease and rapidity in proportion as the enemy establish theirs, since merely by piercing loop-holes through the glacis or curtain, and making an esplanade, which can be done in a single night, the new battery will be ready to open fire the next morning on that of the enemy, as yet hardly begun. As it is probable that the enemy will attempt to establish batteries on the other bank of the Mississippi in order to attack the redoubts that defend it and to silence them by a diagonal fire, it would be necessary to raise in the same and in front of the center of the plaza a good redoubt, which crossing its fires over the river with the redoubts of San Carlos, San Luis, the battery of the park<sup>1</sup> and that of Los Naranjos,<sup>2</sup> will render impossible the passage of the river in front of the city, where it has a width of some 320 fathoms, as well as the construction of batteries which might greatly harass the city.

This redoubt being protected by those of San Luis and San Carlos which would cross their fires in front of it, and by a frigate, equipped with artillery of large caliber, which would anchor farther below, and being able to receive at any moment reinforcements brought by the galleys, the time consumed in attacking and taking it would greatly prolong the siege ; and in case of disaster, if the entry were blown up with a little mine, it would remain open in the direction of the plaza.

It might also happen that the enemy would try to surprise the plaza during a dark night from the river, and it would therefore be advisable, in case of a siege, to shut it in front with a strong stockade, planted at least six feet from the dyke so that, flanked by the batteries of San Luis, San Carlos, the park and Los Naranjos, it would render a successful enterprise of this sort impossible.

In order to secure the plaza against a desperate attack which the enemy may make in advancing with several columns directed successively against the curtains while the redoubts would be diverted from their defense by false attacks calling their fires to the front, I consider it indis-

<sup>1</sup> *El Parque.*

<sup>2</sup> The orange groves ?

pensable to have a body of 150 or 200 cavalrymen, who in case the enemy should effect an entrance anywhere, would sally out from the streets and without giving them time to re-form, after the confusion in which they would necessarily find themselves after passing the fosse and the stockade, would fall upon them, sabre in hand, while the cross-fires of the two redoubts and of the redan would bar the way of those following, who would be obliged to repass the stockade.

The most unfavorable feature of the plaza of New Orleans is that the houses and roofs, being of very combustible wood, would easily take fire and communicate the flame with the greatest rapidity [to the store-houses filled] with munitions and supplies; wherefore it would be well that these should be isolated, built of brick and covered with tiles in the form of a roof-terrace, and also that the citizens should take down their roofs during the siege.

I have made no mention as yet of the difficulty the enemy would have in finding a suitable place for a camp. Being obliged to locate it a long distance from the plaza on account of the reach of the heavy artillery in the same, they can find no position more secure than between the Misisipi and the Cypriera, or line of swampy woods that bound the plain; but the militia and the hunters of the district, accustomed to hunt in the swamps, will harass day and night their flanks and their rear-guard, being sure of finding an impenetrable refuge in the Cypriera and of repulsing any body of soldiers that ventures to follow them into it.

For the same reason the enemy would be obliged to reduce their attacks to a single front, without being able to penetrate with artillery to the other side, which will greatly facilitate the defense.

It is true that from the 15th of June to the 15th of January, that is, during nearly the whole of the six months of the year when the waters of the Misisipi remain low, the vicinity of New Orleans cannot be inundated; but the excessive heat that prevails, with the frequent rain, the mosquitos, the flies, and a thousand other insufferable insects, the putrid fevers, tertian fevers, dysenteries, etc. are sufficient to destroy the most powerful army encamped in the plains during the months of July, August, September and October, and especially an American army quite unaccustomed to such a climate, which is usually mortal to those who come down to the capital by way of the Ohio during the hot season. Moreover, if the

lowness of the Misisipi does not allow the environs of the plaza to be inundated during those months, neither will it allow an army to descend from Upper to Lower Louisiana by the river, and it is by this route only that the cannon for bombarding New Orleans can be transported.

Assuming, however, that the plaza be taken by assault, or obliged to capitulate, it will not be difficult for the troops that garrison the redoubts, to withdraw to that of San Carlos, which for this very purpose has been made larger than the rest, and put in a position to stand another siege with great advantage, thanks to the double batteries that defend all its sides.

As it is probable that the enemy will wish to preserve the buildings of the plaza and lodge themselves therein, they will be informed that it will not be fired upon provided that the city remain neutral ; but that if the least attack is made, or if the redoubt is troubled in any manner from that direction, it will all be reduced to ashes by the fire of the mortars and cannons.

There will be left in the redoubt only enough troops for its defence ; the rest will camp in the ravelin which will be constructed, as soon as the plaza is threatened, almost parallel with the Misisipi ; in its enclosure there will be a large structure of brick, suitable for keeping the provisions in during the siege, and a saw-mill under which the ovens and bakery can be set up without danger from the enemies' fire.

The canal on which the saw-mill is situated forms a deep van-fosse, wide and difficult to pass, its length being commanded by some pieces planted on the platform or terrace of the mill.

The ravelin, which is to serve as an entrenched camp for the troops, will be able to defend itself very advantageously with the artillery and gunnery of the redoubt, as also with the battery of the saw-mill which will command it perfectly. All the advantage of this situation will consist in the difficulty which the enemy will experience in advancing their trenches, planting their batteries and silencing the fires of the double batteries of the redoubt, which will cross the plain while scarcely offering any object for their aim, since the thirty and twenty-four pound artillery planted in the covered road, being mounted on carriages of a new design, will fire on barbe over the glacis almost without exposing itself, while the eighteen-pound guns on the wall placed before the intervals of the former will fire through the loop-holes whose *rodillera* is even with the crest of the wall.

The fires of the redoubt being silenced, surrender becomes inevitable, but in the meantime succor may come from Havana sufficient to force the enemy to retire, especially as he will be greatly reduced by the sickness, deaths and wounds resulting from a long and obstinate defence.

But before capitulating, if the precaution has been observed of maintaining during the siege some galleys in the canal of the saw-mill, it will not be impossible to embark silently and by night a large number of the best troops and gunners, and favored by a good wind and by the current, to reach the fort of Placaminas, on whose conservation will depend the entrance of reinforcements sufficient perhaps to retake Louisiana.

But if Placaminas is lost the recovery of Louisiana must be given up, if the people of the country declare themselves hostile.

This conviction has led me to employ for the defense of this important post, all the resources which the locality, the skill and the short time and the reduced means at my disposition have furnished me.

Forts of  
Placaminas.

Upon ground subject to inundation, swampy and covered with trees, and quite unknown until its environs were cleared, was raised a battery in the form of a bastion, one of the finest that exists perhaps in America: ten 18-pound pieces crown it and command the boats that come up the river against the current, first from stem to stern, then from the side, and finally from stern to stem. However favorable the wind, no frigate can avoid exposure to the fire of the fort for at least a quarter of an hour, and unless the east wind is blowing it will be absolutely forced to anchor under the cannon of Fort San Felipe.

As the river is 284 fathoms wide at this point, for fear the boats might pass very close to the land and attempt in this manner to escape in part the effects of the battery, I had constructed on the opposite bank an earth redoubt with stakes, which I named Fort Borbon, with the two-fold object of dismasting the boats that hug the shore by making them fall under the fort of San Felipe and of furnishing protection to the militia advancing farther below to harass the enemy in their manœuvres and preparations, under shelter of the forests and fallen trees that line the shore in this place.

Not desiring to expose artillery of large caliber in this redoubt, which, in case of a serious attack, would have to be left unprotected, it was furnished with five six-pounders which, commanding the prow of the boats that go up the river, ought, on their doubling a small point that hides



it, from within gunshot, to cut their sails and rigging at the first discharge of chain-shot or grape-shot, which will oblige them to drift or to gain the middle of the river, where, exposed to the fires of both forts, they will be unable to overcome the force of the current, particularly when the river is full.

As the channels have only thirteen or fourteen feet of water, there can enter into the Misisipi no frigate of a burden of more than 26 to 30 cannon, and the largest caliber of these can not exceed 12 pounds; consequently the battery of Fort San Felipe will always be much superior. Neither can the boats manœuvre with the same ease and dexterity as at sea; the current, which becomes more sensible in proportion to their distance from the shore, will not allow them to observe any order or to form in line, so that an expedition attempting to force the passage with the east wind, the only one that would admit of this undertaking, would consume much time and suffer much damage and confusion, if one of them were to get through, either because its rigging would be cut or a mast lost; but supposing it were to succeed in this, the galleys stationed in the Bayou or estuary of Mardi-gras, under the cannon of the fort, from whose small gate they can command the river without exposing themselves, would follow up the expedition with a cannonade, and, protected by the militia of both shores, who would fire upon those presenting themselves in the hostile boats, would disable them before their arrival at the English Turn, the precise point at which the expedition must anchor.

If the enemy, despairing of forcing the pass of Placaminas, attempt to land lower down and form their attack behind the fort, it will of course be impossible to oppose their landing; but as soon as they are within range of the cannon, the 24-pound guns of the galleys stationed in the estuary and some pieces of the left flank of the river-battery will sweep the whole plain so as to force the enemy to approach slowly and to put themselves under cover from fire in order to be able to cross the estuary much farther above the fort and to undertake a regular siege; which will be all the more difficult because water is met with within two feet, at most, of the surface of the earth.

The fort not being clothed behind, and its parapets not having as yet a thickness of over eight feet, it is evident that, as soon as the enemy succeed in planting their batteries behind it, it must capitulate, especially as all the artillery defending it on land consist only of six 4-pound

cannon, intended only to prevent a surprise or an assault ; but the circuit the enemy must take to pass the estuary, to secure their communications, to open the trench, to raise their batteries under the rasant fire of the galleys, will occupy them long enough to permit the arrival of help from the capital sufficient to cause them to renounce the enterprise, or at least to render the ascent of the river a matter of difficulty.

If they decide to make an assault in order to avoid all these delays, immediately after crossing the estuary, 300 men sheltered in the fort could make them repent their temerity, if they are able to make use in time of their artillery charged with grape-shot sustained by the gunnery, by the fires of the galleys that flank the attack, and that of the militia, ambushed farther above the fort in the swamp wood or Cypriera to which the enemy expose their left flank and their rear.

It may be that they will attempt to drive out the militia from the Cypriera; but not only will their flanks then be exposed to the artillery of the fort and of the galleys, but fifty militiamen from lower Louisiana will face them and will without difficulty get the better of four-hundred regular troops, since only the people of the country are able and know how to make their way through the swamps.

The fort of Placaminas can not be thus defended against an enemy that is already master of the capital and that attacks it from above : the Cypriera itself will facilitate the approach of batteries against the upper part of the fort, which will not be able to resist them long, on account of the weakness of its parapets. Therefore, considering the importance of the post, I am of the opinion that the walls of the parapets should be made as strong and thick as possible on the land side ; that it should be furnished with 12-pound artillery ; and, finally, that all its sides should be clothed with brick up to the cordon, a work that may cost about 20,000 dollars, but which will be of great durability and usefulness.

The enemy, once in possession of Placaminas, will be masters of all Louisiana, provided they have previously taken the capital and Galvez-town, since all possibility of succor will thus end.

Having described the means of defense that can be employed in Louisiana against a well directed expedition by way of the Ohio, or the north of the Misisipi, I will detail those that the city itself offers against an expedition from the Gulf of Mexico.

New Orleans, the capital of Louisiana, being the centre

Motives for Fortifying New Orleans. whence are distributed the forces, munitions, provisions and all that is necessary for the defense of the posts, forts and plazas, and being at the same time the centre of the provincial commerce, has the greatest influence on its defense ; for which reason any hostile power will always direct its forces against this city : its situation on the Misisipi at half a league's distance from a branch navigable for schooners and cutters and by which it communicates with the lakes and from these with the sea ; the facility which is afforded by the rivers or their arms on either side of the Misisipi to approach the plaza with smaller craft from every direction without passing through the mouths of the Misisipi, the boats resting at anchor in complete security either in the islands of Navio,<sup>1</sup> Candelaria and Breton or on the other side of the shores of the bay of Barataria — these were the weighty motives that rendered necessary the fortification of New Orleans as it actually is : that is to such extent as the scarcity of time and means permitted.

In fact the Misisipi was at the beginning of 1791 alike undefended above and below ; the fort of New Madrid was then nothing more than a staked enclosure with its banquet garrisoned by 32 men with four four-pound cannons.

The fort of Nogales did not yet exist, and Natchez amounted to nothing more than the old fort dominated from every side so that the English recovered it with a single cannon in 1781.

The forts of Baton Rouge and of Manchak were in the same ruinous condition as at present.

The city of New Orleans had not the least defense and could be reached from the mouths of the Misisipi without the slightest hindrance ; so that in 1787 an English frigate appeared one morning before the city, without any notice of its approach being received and consequently without any permission having been asked to enter and go up the river.

Such was the condition of Louisiana when by royal order of Sept. 28, 1791 I received a commission to put it on a defensive footing ; circumstances not permitting any thing beyond the fortifying as well as possible of the principal points. Natchez and afterwards Nogales (above) were with increasing activity put in condition to offer some resistance soon after the battery of Placaminas was begun below, but as it was not to be expected that such indifferent works could detain the enemy a sufficient length of time

<sup>1</sup> *I. e.*, Ship Island.

to receive powerful succors from Havana, it was necessary to seek means for putting the capital, which must needs be the principal object, in a condition to hold out for some time. Its circumference being 1280 fathoms width including the bank of the river, I built the five redoubts indicated on the plan of the city, uniting them by a covered road and a stockade. I placed on each curtain or front of the line, too long to be protected by the fusillade of the redoubts, a redan furnished with artillery which shortens and defends it, crossing its fires with the perpendicular ones of the curtain and the transverse ones of the flank of the next redoubt.

Knowing that in spite of the redans the enemy might direct their attacks against the curtains with all the more hope of penetrating into the city through them inasmuch as the troops, fearing to be cut off or attacked from the rear, would naturally defend feebly or perhaps abandon the redoubts immediately on seeing the stockade reached, I decided to fortify the front of the redoubts with the same care as the remaining sides: for the same reason I preferred the redoubts of the bastions; in fact it is to be hoped from these that, although the enemy succeed in penetrating the curtains in spite of their direct fires and the crossed ones of the redans and the redoubts, the troops of these, assured of incurring no risk of being forced in them, will direct their fires against those who may have reached the stockade, and will even make a sally to attack their flank while the cavalry would attack them in front.

Finally, finding myself supplied with numerous artillery and having reason to believe that that of the enemy would be much inferior in number and calibre, I was confident of deriving from this fact the most brilliant success and of obliging the enemy to abandon their enterprise.

No occasion offered itself of testing the effects of these combinations; but the province being menaced with an attack by the French by the Gulf of Mexico at the end of '93, their utility became apparent; all the artillery in the enclosure was mounted; the garrison, swelled by the militia from Natchez, was so distributed that the regular troops were to defend the redoubts, and the militia, supported by the cavalry recruited from the country, were to defend the curtains; there were assigned to the defense of the forts of Placaminas 400 men, to be reenforced by 300 more militiamen from the shores below; in the estuary or little port of San Felipe were stationed three galleys mounted with 24-pound cannon: forty fire-boats or incendiary rafts prepared to be directed against the enemy's

boats that might seek to force a passage ; and in order that I might have immediate notice of their arrival at Balize<sup>1</sup> there were placed signal cannons at intervals of two leagues between this place and the capital, *i. e.* in the thirty-two intervening leagues, precautions which the most complete success would doubtless have crowned.

Having already detailed the means of defense afforded by Placaminas, it will suffice to add : that if, contrary to all appearance, the fort should be obliged to surrender, the garrison will have to attempt a retreat by the Cypriera or marshy wood which extends to the capital itself, since having once entered their retreat cannot be cut off by the enemy.

It being probable, after the taking of Placaminas and its being provided with sufficient troops to prevent the entry of succors sent from Havana, that the enemy will reembark to go up the river ; the militia will have to await them at all the bends of the river, in which during the manœuvres made by the boats in order to pass them, the mariners who expose themselves may be shot down.

But as the expedition must inevitably pass what is called the English Turn<sup>2</sup> distant five leagues from the capital, in order to pass, while sounding the bottom, the half league almost entirely made up of windings of the river, that place also will have to be occupied, as it offers the most redoubtable position for awaiting and routing an enemy imprudent enough to engage himself in it without knowledge or precaution.

The narrow projection of land which on each side of the river runs between the lakes and the Misisipi, or between this and the sea, from its mouths, not having at the English Turn more than about 130 fathoms of width between the Misisipi and the Cypriera, which begins as I have said at Placaminas on the eastern side and almost at Balize on the other, an entrenchment may be formed supported on one side by the river and on the other by the marshy wood or Cypriera ; each flank will have to be covered by a good redoubt furnished with artillery which will cross its fires over the river with those on the opposite bank, but the redoubts of the Cypriera will have to advance a little farther forward by means of a bend or angle formed by the entrenchment in order to entirely flank the line : these redoubts would be sustained by two or three hundred militia ambushed in the Cypriera, who would harass the enemy from the rear during the attack of the line.

<sup>1</sup> *La Valiza.*

<sup>2</sup> *Torno del Ingles.*

Behind the entrenchment is a plain well adapted for cavalry, which will form at a distance of three or four hundred fathoms from its front edge, out of reach of the guns, in readiness to fall sabre in hand upon those who may penetrate the line.

Three hundred regular troops with two thousand militia of the province, that is of those who do not miss a man at two hundred paces, and two or three hundred cavalymen, can frustrate in that position the attempts of an army of 10,000 men.

In case of misfortune, the corps which has defended the lines will find a shelter sure and close at hand in the Cypriera, and will make its retreat protected by the cavalry in the plain, and by the militia in the former, which harassing the enemy's flanks by a lively and well directed fire without exposing themselves will oblige him to suspend the celerity of his march and make it easy for the troops to enter the plaza far in advance of his arrival.

The importance of this position had induced the French to fortify it with a line extending from the river to the Cypriera on each side supported by a powerful battery on each side which crossed its fires over the same, another battery being erected farther below and rasant in the place where the Misisipi is narrowest, for the purpose of incommoding the boats during disembarcation and of forcing them to effect this at a great distance from the lines: two companies garrisoned this point in time of peace and it was increased according to circumstances in time of war.

Of all these works and their constructions only useless vestiges remain, but should Louisiana be menaced by a large expedition which might necessitate the sending of three or four thousand men from Havana, it would be fitting to raise up with the same force the defences above mentioned, through which it may be expected that the enemy can be prevented from reaching New Orleans, and consequently from devastating the habitations and surroundings of the plaza.

The galleys anchored below the redoubts of the river bend, too high to be harassed by the fire of the hostile boats, will likewise keep up a formidable fire against them both before and after they are anchored but particularly during the landing of the troops destined for the attack of the lines which the situation of the redoubts will render inevitable.

If the plaza of New Orleans were accessible only by the river it is evident that the English Turn alone, well fortified and garrisoned with a sufficient number of troops,

Fortifications would suffice to protect it, but its situation in the midst of which may the waters, rivers, river-arms and lakes making it accessible either by these and the river San Juan or by Chef Menteur and the road of Gentilly, which lead to the Mississippi river a league below the plaza ; or by the bay of Barataria and canal of Bouligny which opens a league above the plaza ; or by the lakes and the rivers Amit and Iberville, emptying into the Mississippi four leagues below the fort of Baton-Rouge ; by the lake of Barataria, la Fourche de Chetimachas ; or finally by the upper part of the Mississippi ;—it is necessary to add to it all the defenses of which its situation admits. As it is destined by its very situation to be the centre of an immense commerce between all nations, and the vast continent bathed by the rivers Mississippi, Misuri, San Francisco, Colorado, etc., it is fitting it should be surrounded with a wall regularly clothed with brick ; that the same should be done with the redoubts which now defend it ; that there should be added a ravelin in the middle of each curtain and that the whole should be protected by a moat<sup>1</sup> and a regular covered road ; as the country abounds in turf it will suffice to clothe the wall as far as the cordon which will much diminish the expense.

But should circumstances not allow of the undertaking of such a work it will be fitting at least to clothe with brick the redoubt of San Carlos which, serving as citadel for the plaza, can, by means of the double batteries defending it, sustain with 800 or 1000 men a siege of a month, totally independent of the plaza, whose vast extent requires a garrison of 3000 men, not perhaps to be found when wanted, and especially in case of a war with France in which the greater part of the inhabitants can hardly be counted on at all.

This identical consideration induced me to reduce as much as possible the remaining redoubts and yet each of them requires 400 men for its defense.

In case H. M. resolve to clothe the redoubt of San Carlos with brick it will be advantageous to add two double counter guards, *i. e.* with flanks which cover the two rear angles and a ravelin on the front<sup>2</sup> of the same, as is shown in plan 1<sup>st</sup> ; being low or rasant to the ground their cost will be a trifling matter but it would be necessary then to raise the wall of the redoubt three feet. With the half-clothing I have proposed the whole may amount to 70,000 dollars,<sup>3</sup> but the king would then have a very respectable citadel.

<sup>1</sup> *Foso.*

<sup>2</sup> *Garganta.*

<sup>3</sup> *Pesos.*

Plan of defence of New Orleans on the lower part of the Misisipi.      Supposing the enemy, having overcome all the obstacles opposed, succeed in arriving before the plaza, if the pass between the redoubt of San Juan and the Cypriera be well guarded, it will be necessary for their attacks to be directed against the strongest part of it, *i. e.* against the curtain of San Carlos whose plain will be crossed by the double fires of the same, of the redoubts of San Juan and of the redan of the curtain ; the passage of the canal which traverses the plain up to the river-arm being commanded by the saw-mill battery will likewise cost them time and trouble, but as regards the rest of the defence that part of the plaza will be equal to that already mentioned.

New Orleans and Placaminas once surrendered, the enemy will try to become master of the fort I have proposed to erect at Galves-town with the object of cutting off from those of Baton-Rouge, Natchez, and Nogales and others of the upper Misisipi all communication with the sea, rendering impossible all succors which might be introduced by the same as far as the most populous part of the province, it being patent that while the forts of Galves-town and Baton-Rouge are in the power of Spain, powerful succors might be sent from Havana by the lakes, which succors joining with the militia of the province in Baton-Rouge (I speak of the militia which, distant ten or twelve leagues above the capital, would not have to fear the vengeance of the enemy so greatly) and availing themselves of the heavy artillery of Nogales would make a descent on New Orleans and attack it with that advantage and security afforded by a perfect knowledge of the ground and secret understanding with the citizens.

New Orleans might likewise be recovered by a night surprise, by the gate called the gate of the Bayou of San Juan in the manner following, always assuming that the citizens could be counted upon.

Five or six frigates with 300 men each would issue from Havana with the greatest possible secrecy and anchor at the island of Navios with all security and secrecy, since no one frequents that part of the coast : the landing would be affected with barges<sup>1</sup> in the entirely deserted spot called Chef Menteur only seven leagues distant from the plaza and covered with trees ; all being landed with three days' provisions and without artillery would advance the first day within three leagues by a very good road extending from the farm<sup>2</sup> of Maxeut and where there are no dwellings nor people to disclose the expedition ; at night-fall

<sup>1</sup> *Lanchas.*

<sup>2</sup> *Vaqueria.*



next day it would march toward the city and arrive about eleven o'clock by the road of Gentilly, taking care to deviate from three or four houses along the same and to make a circuit to prevent any one from informing the enemy who, surprised by two columns attacking simultaneously the fort of San Carlos and the Gate of the Bayou, would doubtless lose the plaza before being able to form and repel so unexpected an attack.

This same ease with which New Orleans might be surprised obliged me to maintain a boat under command of a reliable officer between the entry of the lakes and the island of Navios with orders to reconnoitre these frequently and to land a man to inform me whenever he might discover boats in these places which, as I have reiterated, being equally distant from the mouths of the Misisipi and from the entry of the lakes are never frequented; the secret intelligence which the French maintained with the malcontents of Louisiana, facilitated the expedition which five frigates were able to undertake from Savannah or Charlestown with great promptitude and secrecy. Passing by the canal of Providence, which the English ship *Jupiter* of 50 cannons, several times passed during the former war, and then standing off from the coast of Havana they would have reached undiscovered the island of Navios.

A little fort or stronghold, which would cost some 2000 dollars<sup>1</sup> on a little height in the pass called Los Rigolets with a battery of four twelve-pounders on the height of Coquilles, would be sufficient to put the place under cover from all surprise in that direction as no vessel can enter the lakes without forcing that pass, very narrow and isolated and which would be commanded.

Another on the mainland or in the bay of Barataria would report all news from that region of the coast and guard the pass or canal opening into the Misisipi a league above New Orleans.

Balize. With the purpose of putting the approaches of Balize<sup>2</sup> or the principal entry of the Misisipi under cover from a surprise like that executed by Count O'Reilly, which facilitated for him the entry of the river, I erected a stronghold on the river arm where La Vigia is situated, defended by two cannons whose embrasures close like those of a ship: it serves as quarters and defense for the 24 men who sleep in it and can not be taken without artillery.

The accompanying plan of the new fort of La Confed-

<sup>1</sup> *Pesos.*

<sup>2</sup> *Valiza.*

eration which I have erected among the Choctaw nation to assure myself of them and of the whole country which is exceedingly fertile and much coveted by the Americans situated between the Misisipi and Yasu,<sup>1</sup> Chicacha<sup>2</sup> and Mobile rivers and the sea, demonstrates the force, solidity and advantage of the strongholds built of tree-trunks or logs 8" by 8" square, whose upper parts cross their fires and command all sides without its being possible to approach the bottom of the tower, it being defended by two salient angles of the first story from which the defenders throw hand-grenades, stones, boiling water, tar, etc.; its cost does not exceed 1000 or 1300 dollars and its duration may be estimated from twenty to thirty years, if the wood is cut in season; finally, thirty men with two four-pounders and four small pieces suffice for its defense not only against Indians, but against any troops not having artillery.

Having demonstrated the utility of the forts of Galvestown and Baton Rouge which I propose to rebuild either to prevent the introduction of the enemy into the very heart of the most essential part of Louisiana, or for the recovery thereof in case Placaminas and New Orleans be lost; it is necessary to consider what might further be attempted to defer the total loss of upper Louisiana, after those forts had surrendered or in case they should not be rebuilt in the event of an invasion of the province.

The post of Natchez being composed of men who have been impressed into service might furnish that of Nogales with some 500 men, good soldiers, if the fear of losing their own houses and possessions did not hold them back; but as for this reason it is not possible to count on them nor on the land-holders of the province, it will be necessary to recruit, with offers and promises of goodly recompense when the province again returns to Spanish domination, all those who have nothing to lose and who hope to advance their fortune by war, as well as the wandering persons<sup>3</sup> who abound in the American establishments of the West, and the savage tribes; but the capital once surrendered these can be but little depended upon, being accustomed to follow the victorious party when best in a position to continue to accord to them the gifts which are customary; however, with brandy and arms some bodies of Indians may also be recruited who will harass the enemy during the siege.

Nogales, being thus disposed, can only be taken by a

<sup>1</sup> Yazoo.

<sup>2</sup> Chickasaw.

<sup>3</sup> *Vagos*.

considerable expedition of the enemy, and while it is in the power of Spain it is not to be feared that upper Louisiana should surrender, since its commerce with the capital would be entirely cut off ; for the enemy to be able to send up 3000 men as will be necessary, with the artillery, provisions and munitions, they will have to have a number of boats almost impossible to get and will have to employ two months, more or less, for the voyage, consequently leaving the forces defending lower Louisiana much weakened, which would expose them to revolution of its inhabitants and militia if these retained an affection for a mild government furthering their interests on account of proximity to the Spanish possessions.

The hunters and savages, granting that some remain favorable to Spain, will embark on the banks of the Misisipi and fall suddenly upon the most advanced boats or on those separated from the main body, which will suffice to strike the sailors with terror and to detain considerably the expedition : in the meantime the sun, the rains, the inconveniences of a long and difficult navigation will cause sickness, losses of munitions and provisions, etc., so that the expedition would arrive weakened and disgusted to undertake a siege whose success will interest the troops so much less as the taking of the place will offer no personal advantage.

The same difficulties and many more will be offered by the taking of the Fort of New Madrid which, likewise cutting off the commerce between the capital and the establishments of Illinois and being capable of providing itself with everything necessary as well by them as by the settlements of the Ohio, should be maintained to the very last.

Thus has been demonstrated the importance of Nogales and New Madrid, either for protecting Louisiana against enterprises of the Americans, or for preserving upper Louisiana, even after the loss of lower Louisiana, or for facilitating the recovery of the latter.

San Luis  
de  
Illinoia

I have thus far deferred treating of the post of San Louis of Ilinoia,<sup>1</sup> the head of the other towns of that district ; wherefore I shall state that being situated on the western bank of the Misisipi, five leagues from the Misuri and five hundred from the capital, it is inhabited by various industrious merchants who correspond with those of the capital, and who would have an immense commerce of skins with the natives of the Misuri if they were favored with the freedom<sup>2</sup> of the capital and against the Canadian

<sup>1</sup> St. Louis.

<sup>2</sup> *Libre*.

English who usurp it, introducing themselves daily more and more upon the river mentioned and among the nations beside it.

A fort garrisoned by 50 men on the river of St. Peter, 120 leagues distant from San Luis itself, would entirely cut off the commerce of the English with the savage tribes of the western shores of the Misisipi and of the Misuri, a commerce so rich that despite the enormous distance of 500 leagues of desert which must be traversed, by their merchandise and by the furs they receive in return, the London companies so engaged do not gain less than one hundred per cent.

The two forts mentioned being erected, many settlers would hasten to the vicinity of them as well from our settlements as from Canada and the shores of the Ohio, who would in a few years change those regions into posts more populous than the present San Luis, and would serve to cover the part of Louisiana above the Misuri against the usurpations of the English and Americans.

The commerce and traffic of the Misuri will produce without burdening the royal treasury and without unusual efforts, immense wealth for Louisiana and will furnish the most solid of all in a considerable product derived from the agriculture, industry and consumption of a large population ; these great advantages ask and await nothing more than the protection of the Government and above all free communication with New Orleans which must necessarily become one day the commercial centre of a vast continent in its trade with the other nations of the globe.

San Luis de Ilinoa being surrounded by savage tribes of great valor and of more industry than our own in lower Louisiana and being exposed to the insults of the Americans and the English, in case of rupture with them, and being at the same time the centre as it were of the commerce of upper Louisiana, it ought to be surrounded with a good stockade with banquet and glacis ; the first being defended at the two angles facing the field of the parallelogram by two good redoubts clothed with stone, and in the centre by the little fort now existing ; part of its inhabitants being men of arms would serve for its defense, wherefore I think that four companies detached from the battalion of New Madrid to San Luis (who would provide the detachments for the rivers of St. Peter and Moine)<sup>1</sup> would suffice to inspire respect for the dominion of Spain throughout upper Louisiana ; and if H. M. should see fit that these should be

<sup>1</sup> Des Moines.

recruited from the strangers who might offer to serve five years in them on condition that we promise to continue rations to those married or who should marry devoting themselves to the cultivation of the soil, during five years more during which they should serve as militia, I am convinced that that battalion would be always complete, which would obviate great difficulties and the great expense involved in transporting troops by the river to such remote places.

Having detailed all that seemed proper regarding the defense of Louisiana, that of western Florida remains to be treated, but as the latter is intimately connected with Mobile and the posts on the Mobile river I shall begin therewith.

The Fort of Mobile, taken from the English in the last war, consists of a regular square with four bastions and a covered road furnished with a good stockade; in its midst dominates a second stockade, to make up for the moat only  $2\frac{1}{2}$  feet deep. The wall and parapets being clothed with bricks, there is no other defect than their slight thickness and the fact that the walls are exposed almost to the bottom to the hostile batteries, motives which hastened their conquest by the Spanish.

The first defect is easy to remedy; and as for the second, by raising the covered road some five feet, clothing the declivity with a good brick wall and elevating the glacis equally above the surface of the ground, Mobile would be a fine fortress, of good defense, and respectable considering the forces which can attack it in America.

Its situation on the Mobile river, which receiving the Alebama is prolonged under the name of Chicachá far beyond the Yasu and almost as far as the Tenesi,<sup>1</sup> renders the possession of Mobile much more important to Spain than that of Pensacola.

Should the states of the West become masters of the Mobile, they would at once open communication by the rivers Ohio, Tenesi, Chicachá and Mobile to the Gulf of Mexico: a short canal would unite the Tenesi and Chicachá rivers, another, much shorter still, would open communication between the Chicachá, Yasu, and Misisipi rivers and between the Chicachá itself and the river Perla, which flows into two lakes back of New Orleans and consequently into the Gulf of Mexico.

These great advantages have excited the avarice of the Americans who have printed their projects as shown in the work entitled *Notes of the Company of South Carolina on*

<sup>1</sup> Tennessee.

<sup>2</sup> *Apuntes*. Probably *An Extract from the proceedings of the South Carolina Yazoo Company*, Charleston, 1791.

*the Yasu*, which I sent to his Excellency the Count of Floridablanca in official secret document No. 9 of Feb. 29, 1792 ; and with the same intention were formed the Companies of Virginia and of the North ; but the same induced me to keep them from those countries, by soliciting and obtaining from the Chactá nation the territory of Nogales on the Chicachá river, where I have built the fort whose plan accompanies, No. 2. By its situation on the river and by means of the fort of Tembecbé, constructed four years ago, seventy leagues below on its bank, the King remains master of all the vast and fertile territory enclosed by the rivers Misisipi, Yasu, Chicachá and Mobile, with the Gulf of Mexico : within this oblong are the lakes and river Perla ; and as there is no savage people therein who can molest the settlers it is greatly to be hoped that this beautiful country will be populated as soon as the freedom of trade shall call to Louisiana emigration directed by enthusiasm and prejudices toward the United States of America.

Fort of  
Tembecbé.

The fort of Tembecbé hastily built by my predecessor is in a ruinous state ; its extent is too great for the small garrison of thirty men which it needs : I have ordered built at once a stronghold on the species of bend on the river, and I consider that with 5000 dollars it may be put into good condition. At a short distance from this is a little village which provides Mobile with corn and which may be very useful to the (fort) of La Confederacion, so named in order to perpetuate between the nations of Chactás, Chicachás, Criks, and Cheroquies the memory of the treaty of friendship and reciprocal guaranty between them and Spain, concluded at Nogales on May 14, 1792.

Fort of  
La Confed-  
eracion.

The establishment of La Confederacion has cost much trouble and difficulty, since the savage nations, extremely jealous of their lands, fear the proximity and ambition of the Europeans : it was necessary to persuade the Chactás that the establishment, located in their midst, had no other object than that of protecting them against the Americans ; to supply a meeting-place equally fitted for the reunion of the deputies or chiefs of the four nations in those cases necessitated by their affairs, the assembling of a Congress in which the Commissary of H. M. is present ; finally to keep therein the supplies of corn and provisions that they may need in times of scarcity. The nation in fact hastens thither but with moderation and is already well satisfied with this vicinage. The King will during some years pay the expense of a supply of provisions that may be estimated at some 2000 dollars at most ; but will

be sure of a post coveted by the Americans and which they could have purchased from the same before ourselves ; and that warlike nation of not less than 14,000 men will be always well affected toward Spain who will help them in need.

Fort of  
Pensacola.

Of Pensacola I ought to say nothing since its works, determined on by the Corte, are already begun ; I was present there and did not alter my persuasion that the English had been guilty of a capital error in leaving the point of the island of Santa Rosa undefended. A good redoubt with its trench, covered road, and glacis, the trench and covered road being defended by a strong stockade furnished with 12-pounders and situated where I had a covered<sup>1</sup> battery raised at the beginning of the war, would have forced us to open the trench which would require much time, both for the landing of necessities, artillery and munitions as well as for making the fascines and other preparations, during which time the enemies could hope that the squadron and transports would be obliged to leave the coast exposed or perhaps to break through, the squadron being naturally very brave ; the two masked frigates at the sides of the redoubt defended by the fort on the other side and by the same redoubt would have crossed fires over the front which they would have reciprocally defended ; and they would not have been obliged by six shots of two 24-pounders placed on barbe at night on the shore of the island of Santa Rosa to expose the entry in order to go to the end of the bay and thenceforth remain useless for the defence of the place ; this redoubt taken we found ourselves in the same necessity as before of forcing the entry and stopping below the fort of Barrancas as we did ; instead of which if, after the entry of our transports into the bay, our general had resolved without wavering to place his camp where it ultimately was during the siege and to batter at once the fort of San Yorge, far distant from the city, with hot shot<sup>2</sup> and small bombs, the latter and Pensacola would have surrendered the same day, the city having no other defence than a stockade.

The desire to take the fort of San Yorge uninjured certainly did not repay the time, expense and risks which its surrender cost.

I therefore repeat that Pensacola, as it can not on account of its situation serve Spain otherwise than as a depository or storehouse for the Indian commerce, and as a shelter for the war-vessels that cruise on the sound,

<sup>1</sup> *Cerrada*.

<sup>2</sup> *Bala roja*.

and at the entry of the canal of Bahama, does not deserve the same attention as Mobile, which would be the key of the navigation of the American settlements and states of the West if it fell into their power.

Two little fortifications at the entrance of the bay, built of stone or brick, the former "cordon" of the city, of posts and stakes, being reestablished and a fort raised on the eminence overlooking the city, would amply suffice both to shelter the latter from aggressions of the Indians or wandering Americans, as well as to render impossible the entry of the bay for any sea-expedition. In fact, if Spain then have enough force in Havana to succor Pensacola, the siege and taking of the fortifications at its entry will give these the time necessary for arriving: if on the contrary there be not enough force in Havana to arrest those of the enemy, it will import little that the siege last two weeks more or less, and the enemy, not finding a place of great force to establish themselves firmly, they will be exposed, after the expedition has withdrawn, to being ejected by another coming from New Orleans by the lakes to Mobile; and from this city, which is only twelve leagues from Pensacola, against the fortification of Las Barrancas Coloradas, the troops crossing overland and the artillery, munitions and provisions being transported in smaller boats from coast to coast supported by some galleys or cannon-boats as far as a league or half league of distance from those mentioned, where all will unite with the army.

If on the contrary much time and money are employed in fortifying Las Barrancas Coloradas and if a principal fortress is made therein there will neither be sufficient men to defend it nor will it perhaps be completed when needed against the enemies of the crown; and however this may be, the city will have to be unprotected, the King losing more than 60,000 dollars worth of edifices existing in it, and the citizens their houses and moles to transfer themselves into the neighborhood of the fortress; considering that in the site where it now is it receives no protection from the fort of San Bernardo, and that its enclosure having fallen it would be exposed to the pillage and insults of the Indians, if the garrison quartered there should not hold them in check.

The defenses of Pensacola being disposed in the manner described, the battalion that garrisons it can provide 50 men for San Marcos de Apalache, sixty for Mobile, 50 for La Confederacion, 30 for Tombecbe and 10 for Tinzas, 50 in the stronghold of San Jorge, 40 in the fortification of Santa Rosa, and remain with more than 300 for the garrison of Barrancas.



San Marcos      The fort of San Marcos de Apalache is necessary for de Apalache. the defence of the entry of the rivers Apalachicola and Flint, by which the Americans would attempt to navigate the Gulf, if they should realize their plan of ejecting the Crik nation from their lands on these rivers ; it serves also to cut off the commerce which the English try to keep up with the Criks below and with the Semanolés ; and finally to provide the latter with the merchandise they require.

The so-called smaller posts, five in number, having no other object than protecting the inhabitants of the districts from the savages, need only an enclosure of stakes with its banquet, four four-pounders and four small pieces.

The presence of the accompanying map, and of the plan of each place and fort which I have sent to your Excellency with document No. 442 will give the most precise idea of all I have exposed and which your Excellency orders me to explain ; but to avoid confusion, I join an extract No. 3, which reveals compendiously the condition of the places, forts and posts of the provinces of Louisiana and western Florida, their importance, defects and the additions needed to put them in the state of defence required by circumstances ; and finally the resumé of all the expenses indispensable for putting Louisiana and western Florida on a defensive footing, with another comprising those which without being so urgent would greatly contribute to their force and security against the Indian nations.

I can not but insist anew on the addition of a fourth battalion to this fixed regiment without which these provinces can not be considered as being in the state of security required by provinces having Americans and Indians on their frontiers ; table No. 6 shows its use and necessity as it must be considered that during the months of July, August, September and October the seventh part of the troops are rendered useless by sickness in New Orleans, Placaminas, Mobile, Natchez, Nogales, Arkansas, New Madrid and San Marcos de Apalache ; but particularly in the capital, where the sixth part of the garrison is in the Hospital, so that the 800 men who are there at present are not sufficient for the daily service of the plaza although reduced to 165 men as appears from No. 6 in which appears a daily diminution of 131 men compared with the entire force.

God our Lord guard your Excellency many years.

Baron de Carondelet

N. O. Nov. 24, 1794.

Rubric

Ex. Señor Duke de Alcudia.